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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE,
THE END OF THE AMERICAN
CENTURY, AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Flynt Leverett*
INTRODUCTION
This essay is grounded in two basic propositions. The first is
that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged
as the leading antagonists in a new Middle Eastern “Cold War” —a
struggle over American primacy in the Middle East that shapes its
geopolitics, even as the region is going through dramatic changes on
multiple levels. The second is that how the U.S.-Iranian competition
for influence plays out will have profound consequences not just for
the Middle East, but also for the legal frameworks, rules-based
regimes, and mechanisms of global governance that shape
international order in the 21st century. This is especially true with

* Flynt Leverett, Professor, School of International Affairs and Affiliate
Faculty, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University; also Visiting
Scholar, School of International Studies, Peking University. With Hillary Mann
Leverett, he is co-author of Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms
with the Islamic Republic of Iran (2013). The Leveretts also write
www.GoingToTehran.com. They are grateful to the other participants in a
symposium sponsored by the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs in
February 2013 (David Andelman, Richard Butler, James Houck, Dan Joyner,
Tiyanjana Maluwa, and Mary Ellen O’Connell) for contributing to this event and to
Butler, Houck, Joyner, and O’Connell for articles flowing from it that appear in the
present issue of the journal.
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regard to U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the Islamic Republic’s
nuclear activities.
Strategic competition between America and Iran and its
implications for international order play out against a backdrop of the
progressive diminution of U.S. leadership in world affairs—the end
of what Andrew Bacevich has called “the short American century.”1
Since Henry Luce proclaimed the American century’s
commencement in 1941, and especially since the Cold War’s end,
America’s status as the preeminent power in the Middle East has
been crucial to its global standing. At the same time, official
American self-presentation and a considerable body of commentary
and scholarship have linked U.S. primacy to the provision of global
public goods; these include the transactional platforms and political
and security arrangements needed to sustain economic openness and
encourage continuing liberalization. The provision of such public
goods has been bound up with the elaboration of rules-based regimes
for key dimensions of international security (e.g., the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty) and global commerce.
For decades, Washington has relied on perceptions of
America as benevolent hegemon to legitimate first its post-World
War II dominance over the non-communist world and then its postCold War primacy, in the Middle East and globally. However, U.S.
administrations have also sought to manage the provision of public
goods to ensure and maximize American power and influence—often
in ways that contravene the image of America as benevolent
hegemon.2
1 Andrew Bacevich, Life at the Dawn of the American Century, in THE SHORT
AMERICAN CENTURY: A POSTMORTEM 1-14 (Andrew Bacevich ed., 2012).
2 See, e.g., DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 6-20 (2011) (discussing how, in its early advocacy for
what would become the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States was
only concerned with forestalling the proliferation of nuclear weapons to preserve
its strategic advantages as one of two nuclear superpowers; it was only in response
to pressure from non-nuclear weapons states that America reluctantly agreed to
include in the Treaty a commitment by nuclear weapons states to nuclear
disarmament and recognition of all states’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear
technology). The relationship of these three core principles in the Treaty and the
ramifications of this relationship for the Iranian nuclear issue is treated at greater
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As the United States experiences relative decline, this
approach becomes less and less sustainable.3 Its perpetuation is also
length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Daniel Joyner,
Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 282
(2013), and Richard Butler, NPT: A Pillar of Global Governance, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. &
INT’L AFF. 272. See also ANDREW BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 1-6, 32-54, 71-116 (2002) (discussing
how American policymakers calculated that the promotion of economic
globalization after the Cold War ended would ensure America’s global primacy well
into the 21st century); Robert Gilpin, The Rise of American Hegemony, in TWO
HEGEMONIES: BRITAIN 1846-1914 AND THE UNITED STATES 1946-2001, 165-82
(Patrick Karl O’Brien & Armand Clesse eds., 2002),
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gilpin.htm (discussing how, in a Cold
War context, Washington leveraged its hegemonic position in post-World War II
regimes for international trade and monetary relations to lock Western Europe and
Japan into security-dependent alliances with the United States); ROBERT GILPIN,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90 (1987) (discussing
how the United States shifted from a more “benevolent” to a more “predatory”
mode of economic hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s to manage its growing
current account and fiscal deficits); ERIC HELLIENER, STATES AND THE
REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S
(1996) (discussing how the promotion of financial liberalization in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s allowed the United States to leverage its unique structural
advantages in international finance to ensure its continued leadership in
international economic affairs even as its position in global manufacturing eroded);
Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, The Balance of Power, Public Goods, and the
Lost Art of Grand Strategy: American Policy toward the Persian Gulf and Rising Asia in the
21st Century, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 202, 210-11 (2012),
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=jlia
(discussing how America’s commitment to secure the flow of Persian Gulf oil and
gas to international markets has never had that much to do with America’s own
energy demand, being motivated to a much greater extent by Washington’s interest
in reinforcing its strategic influence in other important parts of the world where
Persian Gulf hydrocarbons fill critical parts of the energy mix). Since September 11,
2001, the compatibility of aspects of America’s “war on terror” with international
law has been roundly challenged; likewise, the 2003 invasion and subsequent
occupation of Iraq—justified by Washington as essential to Middle East and global
security—is seen by most of the international community as illegal. The
application of use of force doctrine to the Iranian nuclear case is also treated at
greater length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Mary Ellen
O’Connell & Reyam El Molla, The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The
Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 315 (2013) and James
Houck, Caroline Revisited: An Imagined Exchange Between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad
Zarif, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 293 (2013).
3 See Michael Mastanduno, System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and
the International Political Economy, 61 WORLD POL. 121 (2009), for more on this point.
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prospectively dangerous for U.S. interests. Because the structure of
contemporary international relations is shaped by social as well as
material factors, the perceived legitimacy of a great power’s actions
matter greatly.4 As new powers rise, they can leverage Washington’s
hegemonic abuses to marshal resistance to America’s strategic
ambitions and delegitimize its primacy, thereby weakening its
international position.5
Today, the U.S. posture toward the Islamic Republic is the
most potent driver of hegemonic unilateralism in American foreign
policy. Washington’s determination to preserve its ambitions for
dominance in the Middle East puts it on a collision course with the
Islamic Republic, with its strong commitment to foreign policy
independence. With a coterie of European hangers-on, the United
States is focused on forcing the Islamic Republic to abandon its
nuclear program, accept open-ended U.S. and Israeli military
dominance in the Middle East, and acquiesce in its (Westernsponsored) transformation into a secular liberal state. On a regional
level, this makes negotiating plausible solutions with Tehran, on the
nuclear issue and other challenges, virtually impossible. It also puts
America’s Iran policy at odds with material and social reality in the
4 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 220-21, for a discussion
of the importance of legitimacy for American primacy in the Middle East.
5 This is an underappreciated but increasingly salient aspect of what
Robert Pape generically describes as “soft balancing”—the use of “nonmilitary
tools” to “delay, complicate, or increase the costs” of a unipolar leader’s hegemonic
assertions that threaten other states’ interests. In Pape’s presentation, leveraging
“the rules and procedures of important international organizations” and advancing
“strict interpretations of neutrality”—and, I would add, of other aspects of
international law—figure among the nonmilitary tools that can be deployed to
constrain a unipole’s initiatives. See Robert Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United
States, 30 INT’L SEC. 7, 17, 36 (2005),
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/1019-is-30-1_final_02-pape.pdf. See also
Martha Finnemore, Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why
Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be, 61 WORLD POL. 58 (2009),
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Finnemore%20(2009).pd
f (discussing how institutions, laws, and rules—even those originally championed
by a unipolar power—have internal logics of their own that are hard for unipoles to
control, and how “unrestrained hypocrisy” by a unipole undermines the legitimacy
of its primacy); Shirley Scott, International Law As Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship
between International Law and International Politics, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994),
http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol5/No3/art1.pdf.
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Middle East, contributing to the accelerating erosion of U.S. standing
in one of the world’s most vital areas.
On a global level, determination to compel Iran’s surrender
prompts ever more assiduous efforts by America and its partners to
coerce other states into pressing Tehran. In the process, the United
States violates basic principles of rules-based regimes for nuclear
nonproliferation, trade, and other vital issues. Similarly, the lurking
threat that Washington will launch yet another Middle Eastern war to
cut Iran down to size—reflected in U.S. officials’ regular reminders
that “all options are on the table” —breaks international law
regarding the use of force. This, too, is detached from strategic
reality—as the Obama administration’s self-inflicted debacle over its
declared intention to use military force against the Syrian government
following the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21, 2013
vividly demonstrated. The United Nations Security Council was not
about to authorize such a venture—and, in the end, neither the Arab
League, NATO, the British parliament, nor even the U.S. Congress
was prepared to endorse it. This episode suggests that, as America’s
relative decline proceeds, the credibility of its threats to use force for
blatantly hegemonic purposes is eroding as well—which means that
continued resort to such threats is not just illegal, but self-damaging
in strategic terms.
Relative decline challenges the United States to share the
prerogatives of global governance, especially with rising powers in
the global South. Such collaboration would enhance prospects for
more effective global governance by aligning responsibility and
capacity more accurately; it would also help sustain America’s
influence, even as its relative power declines. By contrast, abusively
hegemonic assertions will provoke intensifying backlash from nonWestern powers that will damage America’s long-term position in
international affairs. That is why the manner in which the U.S.Iranian competition for influence in the Middle East plays out over
the next few years—and how the United States conducts itself in this
competition—will decisively affect both America’s international
standing and the dynamics of international order in the 21st century.
This essay, organized in four sections, looks at the
prospective impact of U.S.-Iranian tensions over Iran’s nuclear
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activities on global governance. The first section examines the Iranian
challenge to America’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East and,
more particularly, how the Iranian nuclear program fits into Tehran’s
counter-hegemonic strategy. The second section lays out how U.S.Iranian differences over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities
reflect two very different conceptions of international order. The
third and fourth sections then consider how these different
conceptions of world order lead Washington, Tehran, and their
respective supporters to different positions on what the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty means for the Iranian case, and on what
international law says about the prospective use of force against
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
I. IRAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S
SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER
Since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold
War, the United States’ status as the Middle East’s preeminent power
has been, as noted, crucial to its global primacy. America’s unique
capability to project conventional military power into the Middle East
has enabled it to assume responsibility for the physical security of
hydrocarbon flows from the Persian Gulf, on which the global
economy depends, and to become the presumptive enforcer of order
in the region. This muscle has given the United States extraordinary
economic and political influence in the Middle East, which in turn
has reinforced American dominance in other important parts of the
world.
Today, the biggest challenges to the highly militarized
political and security order that Washington has worked for decades
to consolidate in the Middle East are posed by, associated with, or
potentially exploitable by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hillary Mann
Leverett and I have developed a particular take on the U.S.-Iranian
competition for influence in the region, which we develop in our
book, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the
Islamic Republic of Iran.6 Our take is captured in two related
FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING TO TEHRAN:
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN (2013).
6
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assessments: first, that the United States is, in relative terms, a
declining power in the Middle East; and second, that the biggest
beneficiary of America’s regional decline is the Islamic Republic of
Iran.7
Those unsure whether they agree with these assessments
should compare the positions of the United States and the Islamic
Republic in the Middle East on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, just over
a decade ago, to their positions today. On the eve of 9/11, every
Middle Eastern government was either reflexively pro-American (like
Egypt and Turkey), in negotiation to become pro-American (like
Qadhafi’s Libya and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria), or staunchly antiIranian (like Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and Afghanistan under the
Taliban). Today, because of elections, governments in Iraq, Lebanon,
Libya, Palestine, Tunisia, and Turkey are no longer reflexively proAmerican or anti-Iranian. All are now pursuing more independent
foreign policies—which means they are less enthusiastic about
strategic cooperation with the United States and more open to the
Islamic Republic. The same could have been said for post-Mubarak
Egypt, too, at least until a July 2013 military coup deposed its first
democratically elected (and Islamist) government. To the extent that
any post-coup Egyptian government is interested in maintaining even
a modicum of public support, it cannot afford to be seen as wholly
subordinate to the United States (or Israel). This will surely correlate
with the pursuit of at least some measure of foreign policy
independence. In August 2013, for example, Egypt aligned with
Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon to block an Arab League consensus to
endorse U.S. military action against Syria over the Assad
government’s alleged use of chemical weapons.
As a result of these developments, the United States is in a
profoundly weaker position and the Islamic Republic is in a
significantly stronger position in the Middle East today than they
were on the eve of 9/11. Going to Tehran argues that this shift in the
Middle East’s balance of power is happening both because of serious
U.S. mistakes in the region and because of an Iranian national
security strategy that has enabled Tehran to leverage U.S. mistakes to
its very considerable advantage.
7

Id. at 1-11.
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A. America’s Counterproductive Quest for Middle Eastern
Hegemony
When we refer to U.S. policy mistakes—including but by no
means limited to the Iraq War—we do not identify them as
idiosyncratic products of the George W. Bush administration. Rather,
they stem from a much deeper source that cuts across Democratic
and Republican administrations. We describe it as the United States
giving in to a post-Cold War temptation to act as an imperial power
in the Middle East. For the past twenty years, America has not been
content to maintain its military primacy in the Middle East, defend its
interests there, and legitimize its presence by soberly and effectively
managing the regional balance of power. Instead, it has tried to
remake the Middle East in accordance with American preferences,
working to coerce political outcomes there with the aim of
consolidating a highly militarized, pro-American regional order.
The United States did this by retaining military forces on the
ground in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states after the first Gulf War
(something it did not do, to any significant degree, during the Cold
War, and which led directly to the emergence of Al-Qa’ida and the
9/11 attacks). It did this by leveling sanctions against Saddam
Husayn’s regime that led to the deaths of more than a million Iraqis,
half of them children; by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11
and pursuing prolonged occupations in these countries that have
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians; and by helping Israel
consolidate a nearly absolute freedom of unilateral military initiative.8
As it has pursued these policies, the United States has also worked to
isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran diplomatically, to press it
economically, and to foment its collapse.9
Taken together, these policies constitute what Going to Tehran
calls the imperial turn in U.S. Middle East policy. Pursued with little
regard for on-the-ground realities, this imperial turn has proven not
just quixotic but deeply damaging to American interests. Strategic
failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have squandered human and material
resources, while underscoring for the world, and especially for Middle
8
9

Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 216-20.
LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 279-84, 328-54.
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Eastern publics, the limits of what American military can
accomplish.10 More fundamentally, the imperial thrust of American
policy has decimated the perceived legitimacy of American purposes
in the Middle East for the vast majority of the people living there.
Twenty years ago, perhaps even ten years ago, that fact might not
have seemed so significant. But today, when Middle Eastern publics
are becoming more politically engaged and when their opinions are
mattering more than ever before, this is strategically devastating for
the United States.
When he first ran for president in 2008, Barack Obama
professed to understand this challenge; he pledged to change what he
called the “mindset” that had gotten America into the strategic
mistake of invading Iraq and, more broadly, to recast America’s
Middle East policies. Instead, he has pursued the same sorts of
policies—including on Iran—as his predecessors, policies that did
significant damage to America’s strategic position. As a result, the
Middle East’s balance of power has shifted even further away from
the United States and its allies on Obama’s watch than at the end of
George W. Bush’s presidency.11
B. Iran’s Counter-Hegemonic Strategy.
On the other side of the U.S.-Iranian divide, the Islamic
Republic has developed a counter-hegemonic national security
strategy. This strategy has enabled the Islamic Republic not only to
survive, but also to carve out enough strategic autonomy over the
past 34 years to attain a high degree of political consolidation and to
achieve a wide range of impressive developmental outcomes. By
building a domestic order and pursuing a foreign policy that attracts
Middle Eastern populations, it has also been able to take advantage
of American mistakes to improve its own position in the Middle
East.12

10 This point is also made in Stephen M. Walt, The End of the American
Era, NAT’L INTEREST, Oct. 25, 2011, at 10-11.
11 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 222-23. On Iran more
specifically, also see LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 354-67.
12 While many Western commentators argue that the Islamic Republic’s
internal politics and illegitimacy will undermine it and “solve” America’s Iran
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Going to Tehran draws on years of discussions with Iranian
diplomats, national security officials, and politicians to explain how
the world looks, strategically, from their point of view. Looking at a
map, one sees that Iran shares land, littoral, and maritime borders
with fifteen states.13 Virtually all have been hostile to the idea of an
Islamic Republic in Iran. Several have been more than just hostile:
the Islamic Republic’s eastern neighbor—Afghanistan, under the
Taliban—stormed the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, killing
Iranian diplomats. Its western neighbor—Iraq, under Saddam
Husayn, with help from other Arab neighbors and America—invaded
it, killing 300,000 Iranians. Today, many of those same Arab
neighbors host thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars of the
deadliest U.S. weapons systems, all poised to attack the Islamic
Republic.14
To deal with these challenges, the Islamic Republic has
worked to develop conventional and asymmetric defensive
capabilities, but it has virtually no capacity to project military power
offensively beyond its borders.15 The real key to Iran’s foreign policy
gains in the region has been what Going to Tehran calls its “soft
power” strategy.16 One of the remarkable things about the shift in the
Middle East’s balance of power over the last decade or so, away from
the United States and its allies and toward Iran and its allies, is that
this shift has virtually nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s use
of military force or economic coercion. The Islamic Republic has not
problem, the Islamic Republic is, in fact, supported by a sizable majority of Iranians
living there and is not about to implode—a topic treated at greater length in this
issue of the journal by Hillary Mann Leverett, How Precipitous a Decline? U.S.-Iranian
Relations and the Transition from American Primacy, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 328
(2013).
13 They are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and
the United Arab Emirates.
14 See LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 45-59, for a
discussion on Iranian threat perceptions.
15 On the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, see id. at ch. 2.
16 Harvard’s Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to get others to
“want what you want,” rather than coercing them to do what you want through
hard military or economic power. See JOSEPH S. NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER 31 (1990). Also see LEVERETT & MANN
LEVERETT, supra note 6, 90-101, for a discussion of Iran’s soft power strategy.
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invaded any country or sanctioned any state; its rise is much more
about the growth of its soft power.
Recall my earlier point about the intensifying mobilization of
Middle Eastern publics and the growing importance of those publics’
opinions and attitudes in determining on-the-ground political
outcomes. The Middle East’s balance of power is progressively less
defined by hard military capabilities, where the United States has clear
advantages and the Islamic Republic is relatively deficient, and more
and more defined in terms of who can appeal to regional publics,
where the Islamic Republic has real advantages. In this context, Iran
is pursuing a strategy that galvanizes regional publics’ grievances
against the United States and Israel and against their own
unrepresentative regimes that cooperate, in various ways, with the
United States and Israel. The Islamic Republic, in effect, aligns itself
with those publics, and with public opinion itself, to constrain hostile,
unrepresentative, and pro-Western neighboring governments from
working with the United States to attack it. Over the years, Tehran
has reinforced these aspects of its soft power strategy by picking
political winners as its allies in key regional arenas—e.g., Hizballah in
Lebanon, Shi’a Islamist and Kurdish parties in Iraq, and HAMAS in
Palestine.17
Washington dismisses much of this as Iranian “support for
terrorism.” But, with all due respect for the paramilitary capabilities
of Iranian-supported groups resisting Israeli occupation, or resisting
violent jihadi elements like Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, the most
interesting thing about these groups is that, when given the chance,
they win elections. And they win for the right reasons—because they
authentically represent unavoidable constituencies with real and
legitimate grievances. When the United States refuses to deal with
these groups by calling them terrorist organizations, it reduces even
further its chances of constructively influencing regional
developments, and opens up even more political space for Iran.
The soft power logic of Iranian strategy applies even in the
case of Syria and the ongoing conflict there. It has become
conventional wisdom in Washington that whatever soft power gains
17

LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 64-78.
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the Islamic Republic had accrued in the Middle East over the past
decade or so have been squandered as a result of the support that
Tehran and its Hizballah allies have extended to Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad and his government. But Iran and Hizballah have a
very different assessment. They evaluate the Syrian conflict as the
product of a U.S.- and Saudi-instigated campaign for regime change
in Damascus, motivated by American and Saudi interest in
undermining the Islamic Republic’s security and weakening its
regional position.18 Hizballah, for its part, identifies a “U.S.-Israelitakfeeri project” that has been unleashed in Syria, aimed at changing
Syria’s strategic orientation in order to enfeeble Iran and Hizballah’s
capacity to resist American and Israeli hegemonic aspirations in the
region.19 Iranian and Hizballah officials recognize that backing the
Assad government has cost the Islamic Republic and Hizballah some
of the enormous standing that they have built up with Sunni Arab
publics—especially as Saudi Arabia and others on the Arab side of
the Persian Gulf work assiduously to cast the Syrian conflict in
sectarian terms. But in their calculations, as regional appreciation
grows that the Syrian conflict is, at its core, about resistance, the
sectarian issue will fade.20 In the meantime, the Islamic Republic
18 See Kayhan Barzegar, Rouhani, Iran Key to Political Solution in Syria, ALMONITOR (June 17, 2013),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/iran-hassan-rouhanigeneva-syria.html, for information about the Iranian policy toward Syria.
19 Discussions with Hizballah representatives in Beirut, Lebanon. (June
2013). See also Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on
Hizballah’s Resistance and Liberation Day (May 25, 2013) and Sayyid Hassan
Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on Hizballah’s Injured Fighter Day
(June 14, 2013), for discussions of the Syrian conflict. In a religious context, the
Arabic word takfeer refers to the practice of declaring someone claiming to be
Muslim as kāfir, pl, kuffār—an unbeliever masquerading as a pious person. It is a
prominent aspect of the kind of salafi Islam championed by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd
al-Wahhab, the 18th century preacher whose religious ideas continue to ground the
form of Islam officially promulgated by Saudi Arabia, both at home and abroad.
Over the last thirty years, takfeeri ideology—which is, among other things, anti-Shi’a
in orientation—has been a powerful motivator for Saudi-supported jihadi
movements (e.g., Afghan mujahideen, parts of whom evolved into Al-Qa’ida and the
Taliban, and, more recently, jihadi groups in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, some of which
have publicly affiliated themselves with Al-Qa’ida).
20 For further discussion, see Hal intahat julat Qusayr wa tudā’yāthā [Has the
Qusayr round ended and what are its implications?] (Interview with Flynt Leverett),
MIN AD-DAKHIL (Al-Mayadeen), July 7, 2013,
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retains vastly higher favorability ratings with Arab and other regional
publics than the United States.21
C. Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program
How does Iran’s nuclear program fit into its foreign policy
and national security strategy? To answer this question, it is
important to consider first what the program actually comprises.
In terms of reactor infrastructure, Iran currently operates the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)22 that, among other things, produces
medical isotopes for cancer patients, under international safeguards.23
Additionally, Iran now operates a Russian-built power reactor at
Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf, also under safeguards, and is building a
heavy water reactor at Arak. Besides reactors, Iran is developing
indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In its main enrichment plant at
Esfahan and in a newer site at Fordo, Iran is enriching uranium, again

http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/Programs/Episode/dmqS2FYuUkeiDqH3AP3_4
w/2013-07-07-هل-ان تهت-جول ة-ال ق ص ير-و-ات هات داعي. It is also notable that, while
HAMAS declined to fight for the Assad government after the Syrian conflict broke
out and relocated its external political leadership from Damascus, it has not called
for Assad’s removal. In discussions in Doha, Qatar in May 2013, senior HAMAS
officials said that they continue to hold that a negotiated settlement between the
Syrian government and the opposition is the only way to end the conflict—
essentially the same position taken by Iran and Hizballah.
21 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Iran and the United States—
What Really Matters to Middle Eastern Publics?, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/iran-and-theunited-state_b_2821860.html, for information on this point. See also SHIBLEY
TELHAMI, THE WORLD THROUGH ARAB EYES: ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
RESHAPING OF THE MIDDLE EAST 129-30, 134-35, 137-43 (2013).
22 America originally gave the TRR to the Shah—who openly stated his
intention to develop nuclear weapons—in the 1960s. Initially, the TRR ran on
uranium fuel enriched to weapons-grade levels. After the Iranian Revolution, the
Islamic Republic reconfigured it to run on fuel enriched to just below 20 percent,
greatly reducing the proliferation risks of its operation. LEVERETT & MANN
LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 86-87.
23 The TRR is located on the fringes of the University of Tehran campus
in the middle of the city; one can see it from the conference room of the
university’s Faculty of World Studies, where Hillary Mann Leverett and I have
given guest seminars.
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under safeguards, to the 3-4 percent level needed to fuel power
reactors and to the near-20 percent level required by the TRR.24
Since the early 1990s, American and Israeli intelligence
services have warned that Iran is three to five years away from
acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet twenty years into this constantly
resetting forecast, no intelligence agency has come remotely close to
producing hard evidence that Iran is trying to fabricate nuclear
weapons. Even at the near-20 percent level, Iran is below both the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 20-percent threshold
for highly enriched uranium and the 90-plus-percent level for bombgrade material. The IAEA has, for years, consistently affirmed that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material from Iran’s nuclear
facilities, and has never found evidence Iran is enriching anywhere
close to weapons-grade levels. Indeed, American and Israeli
intelligence services currently say that Iran is, at this point, not
working to fabricate nuclear weapons.25
Going to Tehran identifies two powerful reasons why the
Islamic Republic is unlikely to build such weapons. First, there is
strong consensus among Iranian political and policy elites that
acquiring a relatively small nuclear arsenal would diminish, not
enhance the Islamic Republic’s security.26 Second, beyond this
strategic rationale, both Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s
“founding father” and its first Supreme Leader, and Ayatollah
Khamenei, the current Leader, have declared that nuclear weapons
violate Islamic law, that they are haraam—forbidden by God.
One may discount this as mere talk, but there is an important
precedent where the Islamic Republic also walked the walk on this
issue. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran was subjected for
years to chemical attack—against civilian as well as military targets—
while the United States (which was backing Saddam Husayn’s war of
aggression against the fledgling Islamic Republic) blocked the United
Nations Security Council from taking any action on the matter. As
the attacks continued, Iranian military commanders asked for
24
25
26

LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 81-85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
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Khomeini’s authorization to use the infrastructure inherited from the
Shah to mass produce chemical weapons agents and fabricate
chemical weapons, so as to be capable of retaliating in kind against
Iraqi chemical attacks. Khomeini said no, holding that chemical
weapons were haraam (forbidden by God) and that the Islamic
Republic would not use them, even though it was being regularly
subjected to chemical attack.
Khomeini and Khamenei have both said that nuclear
weapons, like chemical weapons, violate God’s law. In a system that
legitimates itself in no small part on the basis of its perceived
adherence to Islamic law, that is not a trivial thing.27
So if the Iranian nuclear program is not a weapons program,
what are its purposes? Three stand out. First, while a lot of Western
commentary derides the suggestion that the program has an
economic rationale, there are, in fact, real economic and
technological benefits that Iran accrues from its nuclear activities.
They allow Iranian scientists, engineers, and technicians to develop
expertise (for example, in centrifuge technology) applicable beyond
the nuclear arena and to establish new sectors (for example,
producing medical isotopes) for the Iranian economy. Iran already
exports electricity to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, and
wants to expand such exports in the future. Developing nuclear
energy for the purpose of power generation directly supports this
ambition. It also prospectively allows the Islamic Republic to devote
more of its oil to export or to value-adding processes like oil-based
petrochemicals. Likewise, nuclear energy frees up natural gas for
injection into aging oil fields and for cultivating petrochemicals and
other gas-based industries.28
Second, from a security perspective, the way that the program
has developed suggests that it is partly aimed at giving the Islamic
Republic some measure of what is often called a nuclear option by
allowing Iranian scientists and engineers to develop at least some of
the core competencies for fabricating nuclear weapons, but without
actually building them. Policy elites across the Iranian political
27
28

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
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spectrum acknowledge that perceptions the Islamic Republic is
developing such a nuclear option have deterrent value even without
overt weaponization. Furthermore, the nuclear program gives Tehran
leverage to compel Washington to come to terms with it, making the
nuclear issue an attractive point of entry for dealing with the United
States and other major powers on larger strategic questions.29
Third—and most importantly—the program’s main strategic
purposes are political rather than military. The Islamic Republic is
pursuing its nuclear rights in defiance of America and Israel—and
that has powerful resonance not just at home but across the region.
Some Arab leaders may not like the Iranian program, but polls of
predominantly Sunni Arab populations show large majorities have
been strongly supportive of Iran’s nuclear efforts. Some even show
large majorities of Arabs thinking it would be a good thing if Iran
acquired nuclear weapons.30
And that brings us back to Iran’s soft power strategy.
Through its narrative—not its drones or tanks or even its centrifuges,
but its narrative—the Islamic Republic is using the political
awakening of Middle Eastern publics to alter the very nature of
power politics in the region. The Middle East’s balance of power is
becoming, more and more, a balance of influence. The Islamic
Republic is both encouraging and taking advantage of this transition
to enhance its own regional standing.
II. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER
The resulting shift in the Middle East’s balance of power—
simultaneously distributional (affecting who has relative power) and
essential (about the basis of power)—poses a high-stakes challenge
for U.S. foreign policy. For its own interests, and on classic balanceof-power grounds, America needs strategic rapprochement with the
Islamic Republic. But Washington’s longstanding determination to
suppress the emergence of independent power centers in the Middle
East continues to warp U.S. policy choices toward the Islamic
Id. at 88, 90.
Id. at 88-90. See also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 21;
TELHAMI, supra note 21, at 135-38.
29
30
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Republic and the region more generally. It also warps the U.S.
attitude toward global governance.
U.S.-Iranian tensions over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear
activities reflect two different ways of thinking about international
order. One might be described as a positivistic, rules-focused
approach. In this approach, substantive and procedural norms for
international behavior are created by the consent of independent,
sovereign states. Thus, international order is based very much on lex
lata, what the law actually is, not lex ferenda, what the law (from one
ideological view or another) should be. From a positivistic
perspective, rules and norms, once created, are to be interpreted very
narrowly, in terms of both how they are interpreted and who
interprets them.
The alternative is a more policy-oriented—one might say
results-oriented—approach. From this perspective, what matters are
the policy goals and values that motivate the creation of particular
rules and norms—not the rules and norms themselves, but the goals
and values underlying them. In further contrast to the positivistic
approach, the policy-oriented approach ascribes a special role in
interpreting rules and norms to the most powerful states in the
system—those states with the resources and willingness to act in
order to enforce the rules.31
If one looks at who supports one of these approaches over
the other, the positivistic approach is very much favored by nonWestern states. States in what we used to call the Third World have
sharply criticized “colonial” international law for having warped the
positivist principle of consent as the basis for international legal rules
and obligations. But, with a universalized respect for national selfdetermination, they have also embraced a positivist orientation to
international law as an indispensable foundation for globalizing core
legal principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in states’
31 See the following sources for more on the contrasts between these
approaches: ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 67-86 (1999); Tai-Heng Cheng, Making International Law Without Agreeing
What It Is, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2011); and David Kleimann,
Positivism, the New Haven School, and the Use of Force in International Law, 3 BSIS J. INT’L
STUD. 26 (2006) (focusing on use of force questions).
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internal affairs.32 From a non-Western perspective, it is only through
this kind of positivism that international law, rules, and norms might
actually constrain established powers as well as rising powers and the
less powerful.
Correspondingly, the policy-oriented approach tends to be
favored by Western powers—above all, by the United States. Its
modern intellectual roots go back to the 1950s and 1960s and the socalled New Haven school of international law, forged by a network
of scholars based largely at Yale Law School, the central figures in
which were Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. Whatever their
scholarly ambitions to reconstruct international legal methodology,
the main policy-oriented goals of McDougal, Lasswell, and their
protégés (as opposed to mere students, some of whom took very
different policy positions) was to justify U.S. foreign policy in the
Cold War context, especially regarding nuclear weapons, Third World
intervention, and use-of-force questions.33 Another prominent Yale
32 See Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse
between Tibet Region of China and India (April 29, 1954), 299 United Nations
Treaty Series 57 (1958); Scott, supra note 5, at 2-3; S. PRAKASH SINHA, NEW
NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1967); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, NEW STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION (1987);
Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 79-82 (2003);
Dai Bingguo, Asia, China and International Law, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012);
Christopher Clapham, Sovereignty and the Third World State, 47 POL. STUD. 522, 52229 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L.
184 (1998); Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International
Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353 (1998); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third
World Resistance in International Law, 10 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT’L L. 19 (2006); Ram
Prakash Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of
International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1966); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the
Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 121 (1965); Steven Weber et al., A World Without the West, NAT’L INT., Summer
2007, at 25-28; and Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence, XINHUA, June 14,
2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm.
33 For representative presentations drawn from a sizable bibliography, see
the following: Myres McDougal, Foreword to ROGER H. HULL & JOHN C.
NOVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM at vii-ix (1968); Myres McDougal, Foreword to
JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR at vii, xi (1972); Myres
S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1958), reprinted in MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
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law professor and dean, Eugene Rostow (who became a leading
neoconservative foreign policy intellectual in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s) also contributed to this agenda.34 In the post-9/11 period, the
policy-oriented approach continues to have high-profile advocates in
the legal academy, encompassing neoconservatives advocates of
American unilateralism and preventive war on the right and liberal
champions of humanitarian intervention and the “responsibility to
protect” on the left.35 Certainly, over the last half century, its logic has
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); Myres McDougal & Harold Lasswell,
The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(1959), reprinted in MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960);
and W. Michael Reisman, Deterrence and International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 339 (1983). For examples of contrary positions taken by international
legal scholars trained at Yale during McDougal and Lasswell’s heyday, see the
following: Richard Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of Law, 104 YALE L.J.
1991 (1995) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
(1992)); Richard Falk, Toward A Legal Regime For Nuclear Weapons, 28 MCGILL L.J.
519 (1983); Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, & Jack Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and
International Law, INDIAN J. INT’L L. 541 (1980); Richard A. Falk, International Law
and the United States Role in the Vietnam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966); Burns H.
Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Prolegomenon to General Illegality, 4
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227 (1983); and Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons
Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983).
34 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Is There a Legal Basis for Nuclear Deterrence Theory
and Policy?, in LAWYERS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 175 (1988); EUGENE
ROSTOW, TOWARD MANAGED PEACE: THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1759 TO THE PRESENT (1995).
35 On the neoconservative side, see, for example, Robert J. Delahunty &
John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 35 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, Fire
When Ready, FOR. POL’Y (March 19, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire_when_ready; Eric
Posner, Think Again: International Law, FOR. POL’Y (Sept. 17, 2009),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/17/think_again_international_la
w; and John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). On the liberal side,
see, for example, Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1 (2004); Lee Feinstein &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOR. AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283
(2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of
UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 619 (2005); Thomas Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the
World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741 (2006); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Was the Libyan
Intervention Really an Intervention?, ATLANTIC, Aug. 26, 2011,

258

2013

Leverett

2:2

been strongly reflected in the perspectives that U.S. administrations,
Democratic and Republican, have brought to bear in legal analyses of
foreign policy questions.
III. THE IRANIAN CASE AND THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
Tensions between these divergent conceptions of world order
condition U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the status of the Islamic
Republic’s nuclear activities under the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime, which rests on the foundation of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, which opened
for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is the
international community’s main vehicle for regulating nuclear energyrelated technologies in both civil and military applications,36 It is
appropriately understood as a set of three interrelated commitments
by parties, which are divided into two categories, nuclear-weapon
states [hereinafter “weapons states”] and non-nuclear-weapon states
[hereinafter “non-weapons states”].


In Article II and Article III, non-weapons states—like
Iran—commit not to build or acquire nuclear weapons.



In Article VI, weapons states—the United States, Russia,
Britain, France, and China—commit to good faith
negotiations for nuclear disarmament.



In Article IV and Article V, all agree that parties have an
“inalienable right” to use nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes “without discrimination”—and are obligated to

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/was-the-libyanintervention-really-an-intervention/244175/; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intervention,
Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty, ATLANTIC, Sept. 4, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/intervention-libyaand-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/; and Ivo Daalder & James Steinberg,
Preventive war, A useful tool, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at M3,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/04/opinion/op-preemptivewar4.
36 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 3, 20.
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facilitate the exercise of that right, especially by nonweapon states.37
There have long been strains between weapons states and
non-weapons states over weapons states’ poor compliance with their
commitment to disarm. Today, though, these tensions are particularly
acute over perceived tensions between NPT signatories’ commitment
to nonproliferation and their commitment to enabling the peaceful
use of nuclear technology.
A. Reading (and Misreading) the NPT
The two alternative conceptions of international order
outlined above give rise to very different perspectives on interpreting
the NPT regarding this issue. One perspective—grounded in the
positivistic model of international law and global governance—gives
the Treaty’s three core bargains equal standing. The other—grounded
in the policy-oriented model—holds that non-weapons states’
commitment to nonproliferation trumps those by weapons states to
nuclear disarmament and by all to the peaceful use of nuclear
technology. Conflict between these perspectives is especially sharp
over fuel cycle technology, the ultimate “dual use” capability (for the
same material that fuels power and research reactors can, at higher
levels of fissile isotope concentration, be used in nuclear bombs).
For those holding that the NPT’s three core bargains have
equal standing, the right of non-weapons states to safeguarded
enrichment is clear—from the Treaty itself, from its negotiating
history, and from subsequent practice, with at least a dozen nonweapons states building fuel-cycle infrastructures potentially capable
of supporting weapons programs. From a positivistic perspective, the
denial of that right by a handful of powerful states amounts to an
effort to rewrite the NPT unilaterally. Not surprisingly, the camp
espousing this position includes the non-Western world, virtually in
its entirety. By contrast, those claiming that nonproliferation trumps
the NPT’s two other core bargains claim that there is no treaty-based
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
37
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“right” to enrich. From a policy-oriented perspective, the manner in
which non-weapons states pursue the peaceful use of nuclear
technology must necessarily be subordinated to the NPT’s overriding
goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. This position is
advocated primarily by Western powers, including the United States.
Strikingly, Washington once held that the right to peaceful
use includes the indigenous development of safeguarded fuel cycle
capabilities. In 1968, as America and the Soviet Union, the NPT’s
sponsors, prepared to open it for signature, U.S. officials told
Congress that the Treaty permitted non-weapons states to pursue the
fuel cycle.38 Since the Cold War’s end, though, the United States—
along with Britain, France, and Israel—has been determined to
constrain the diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities to non-Western
states. Their main motive has been to maximize America’s freedom
of unilateral military initiative and, in the Middle East, that of Israel.
Thus, the United States has come to hold that there is no
treaty-based right for non-weapons states to pursue fuel cycle
capabilities, and that weapons states and their allies with nuclear
industries are entitled to decide which non-weapons states can
possess fuel cycle technologies. From these premises, in the early
2000s the Bush administration sought a worldwide ban on
transferring fuel cycle technologies to countries not already
possessing them.39 The Obama administration then pushed the
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to make such transfers conditional on
recipients’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the NPT—an
instrument devised at U.S. instigation in the 1990s to enable more
intrusive and proactive inspections in non-weapons states.40
Non-Western states see these efforts to constrain the
diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities as a far greater threat to the NPT’s
integrity than Iran’s nuclear activities. Among rising powers, Brazil
and South Africa—both nonproliferation exemplars for joining the
NPT as non-weapons states after forsaking weapons programs
Daniel Joyner, The Security Council as Legal Hegemon, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L.
225, 243 (2012).
39 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 47-51, 55-60, 78-87.
40 Id at 110-12.
38
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during democratization (including, in South Africa’s case, dismantling
six fully fabricated nuclear bombs that Israel helped the apartheid
regime to assemble)—have been especially resolute in defending nonweapons states’ right to the fuel cycle. With Argentina, they resisted
U.S. efforts to make transfers of fuel cycle technology contingent on
non-weapons states’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol (which
Brazil has refused to sign), ultimately forcing Washington to
compromise.41
B. The NPT and Iranian Enrichment
Currently, the conflict over how to read the NPT with
respect to non-weapons states’ fuel cycle activities is engaged most
prominently over whether Iran, as a non-weapons party to the
Treaty, has a right to enrich uranium under international safeguards.
Disagreements over the issue are effectively blocking efforts to
resolve the controversy over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program
through diplomacy.
In the Iranian case, just four countries—the United States,
Britain, France, and Israel (which is not a signatory to the NPT)—
have led the charge to deny the Islamic Republic’s right to enrich. In
these countries’ official view, Iran has forfeited whatever “right” to
enrich that its representatives might assert because of problems in its
compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement that cast doubt on
the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Western and Israeli
intelligence services also claim that the Islamic Republic has done at
least theoretical work on aspects of nuclear weapons design and
fabrication, thereby raising further serious questions about the
peaceful nature of its program. Since 2006, moreover, the United
Nations Security Council has adopted seven resolutions calling on
Iran to suspend its fuel cycle activities.42 The Islamic Republic has yet
David Jonas, John Carlson, Richard Goorevich, The NSG Decision on
Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: ABACC and the Additional Protocol, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/The-NSGDecision-on-Sensitive-Nuclear-Transfers-ABACC-and-the-Additional-Protocol.
42 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747
(Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res.
1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1887, U.N. Doc.
41
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to comply with these resolutions, prompting Western criticism of its
failure to meet its “international obligations.” For America and its
British, French, and Israeli partners, any diplomatic solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue will require Iran to terminate its fuel cycle
activities—or, at least, to stop them on an open-ended and long-term
basis (at least a decade, if not longer).43
In contrast, the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South
Africa) and the Non-Aligned Movement (with 120 countries
representing nearly two-thirds of U.N. members) have unequivocally
recognized Iran’s right—as well as that of other non-weapons
states—to develop safeguarded indigenous fuel cycle capabilities.44
Their position strongly reflects both a positivistic conception of
international order and an interpretation of the NPT ascribing equal
standing to its three core bargains.
From a positivistic point of view, none of the claims by
Western intelligence agencies about Iranian research on nuclear
weapons design and fabrication has been substantiated by hard
evidence, and none contradicts the IAEA’s continuing affirmation of
Iran’s non-diversion of nuclear material. Through a positivistic prism,
moreover, one cannot legitimately hold that the NPT prohibits the
Islamic Republic from seeking the same standing, in terms of its
nuclear infrastructure and capabilities, as Japan, Canada, and others
S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009); and S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9,
2010).
43 Discussions with American, British, and French officials. Western
powers demand that Iran promptly stop enriching at the near-20 percent level; it
must then comply with Security Council calls to cease all enrichment. U.S. officials
say that Iran might be “allowed” a circumscribed enrichment program, after
suspending for a decade or more; on this point, see also Robert Einhorn, Getting to
‘Yes’ with Iran, FOR. POL’Y (July 10, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/getting_to_yes_with_iran.
London and Paris insist that “zero enrichment” is the only acceptable long-term
outcome.
44 See BRICS Summit draws clear red lines on Syria, Iran, BRICS POST (Apr. 3,
2013), http://thebricspost.com/brics-summit-draws-clear-red-lines-on-syriairan/#.Uewc_UrD-AI; Jason Ditz, Non-Aligned Movement Unanimously Backs Iran’s
Civilian Nuclear Program, ANTIWAR.COM (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://news.antiwar.com/2012/08/31/non-aligned-movement-unanimouslybacks-irans-civilian-nuclear-program/.
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that joined the Treaty as non-weapons states but are widely seen as
able to produce nuclear weapons in relatively short order, should they
choose to do so. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate under
whose leadership the IAEA correctly assessed Iraq’s lack of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) when every Western intelligence agency
got it wrong, has said that developing nuclear weapons capability—
not weapons, but competencies needed to make them—is “kosher”
under the NPT.45
For many positivistically-inclined analysts, the Security
Council resolutions calling on the Islamic Republic to suspend
enrichment violate Iran’s rights as both a sovereign state and as a
party to the NPT. By extension, they also violate United Nations
Charter provisions directing that the Security Council act “in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”
and “with the present charter” and are, thus, invalid.46 Additionally,
the first of these resolutions, from 2006—on which all of the
subsequent resolutions are based—reflects an assessment of Tehran’s
intent to build nuclear weapons that America’s own intelligence
community repudiated in 2007. This repudiation arguably nullifies the
legal basis for all seven resolutions calling on Iran to suspend
enrichment.47
For non-Western states and others holding that the NPT’s
three core bargains have equal standing, the outlines of a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue are as clear as Iran’s right to
enrich: recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights in exchange for greater
transparency in its nuclear activities. Working with Turkey, Brazil
brokered the Tehran Declaration in May 2010, in which Iran
accepted U.S. terms to swap most of its then stockpile of enriched

See Mohamed ElBaradei, A New Global Security System Towards a
World Free From Nuclear Weapons at John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University (Apr. 26, 2010), http://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/newglobal-security-system-towards-world-free-nuclear-weapons-conversationmohamed-el.
46 For a brilliant exposition of this argument, see Joyner, supra note 38.
47 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Iran Policy and the
Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-August 2013, at 40,
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.
45
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uranium for fuel for its research reactor.48 The Declaration, though,
also recognized Iran’s right to enrich; for this reason, the Obama
administration rejected it.49 Through the Non-Aligned Movement
and other fora, non-Western states regularly reiterate their view that a
negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue will require
Western acknowledgment of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear rights.
From this premise, Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to
suspend impede, rather than encourage, productive diplomacy.50
Even Russia and China, the Security Council’s two non-Western
members, who acquiesced in all seven resolutions telling Tehran to
suspend, note regularly that there will be no diplomatic solution
absent Western recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights.51
The basic idea of recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights, as a
sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT (including the right to
enrich uranium under international safeguards), in exchange for
greater transparency surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities, has long
been the core of the Islamic Republic’s approach to nuclear
diplomacy with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council plus Germany). Since Hassan Rohani’s election as
Iran’s president in 2013, the Islamic Republic’s new foreign minister,
Javad Zarif, has advanced a substantive proposal to the P5+1 for
resolving the nuclear issue on this basis, within a finite period. But
the Obama administration and its British and French partners
continue to insist, effectively, that “transparency is not enough”—
48 See Text of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal, Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog,
GUARDIAN, May 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borgerglobal-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear.
49 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Flynt Leverett Debates
Obama’s Iran Policy with Dennis Ross, RACE FOR IRAN (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.raceforiran.com/flynt-leverett-debates-obama%E2%80%99s-iranpolicy-with-dennis-ross.
50 On the unhelpful impact of the Security Council resolutions on nuclear
diplomacy with Tehran, see, for example, Reza Nasri, To Nudge Iran Talks, New
Resolution Needed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0425/
To-nudge-Iran-talks-new-UN-resolution-needed.
51 Conversations with Russian and Chinese officials suggest that Moscow
and Beijing acquiesced to these resolutions partly to keep the United States in the
Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue, where they can exert ongoing
influence—and restraint—over Washington.
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that, if Iranian enrichment can be tolerated at all (and it remains
unclear that Washington, London, and Paris are prepared to tolerate
it), the Western powers must become, in essence, co-managers of the
Iranian nuclear program, determining which Iranian nuclear facilities
must be closed and which might be allowed to remain open,
determining not how many additional centrifuges Iran might be
allowed to install in the future but how many centrifuges it must
dismantle to satisfy the United States (and Israel).
How these differences over Iran’s nuclear activities are
handled will profoundly affect the future of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. In his contribution to this symposium,
Daniel Joyner rigorously scrutinizes the NPT and the various legal
sources for the IAEA’s dealings with Iran; from this analysis, he
comes down on the side of an essentially positivistic reading of the
Iranian nuclear case.52 Just as importantly, he and Richard Butler both
warn that warped interpretations of the NPT, distorted readings of
the IAEA’s legal sources, and biased application of the law by
America and its European hangers-on will further undermine the
functioning of the current nonproliferation regime, the credibility and
legitimacy of which are already eroding for ever larger parts of the
international community.53
IV. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CASE AND USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE
Tensions between the two divergent conceptions of
international order described above are also reflected in debates over
the proper interpretation of use of force doctrine54 and its application
to the Iranian nuclear case. To put the question in its simplest form,
if some states judge, based on their particular (and almost certainly
policy-oriented) readings of the NPT, that the Islamic Republic is in
violation of its Treaty obligations, can they find legal justification for
a preventive attack against it?
Joyner, supra note 2.
Butler, supra note 2.
54 See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 699 (2005) (outlining four schools of thought, two of which, labeled “strict
constructionist” and “imminent threat,” fall into what is described here as the
positivist camp, and two of which, labeled “qualitative threat” and “charter-isdead,” fall into the policy-oriented camp).
52
53
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The perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian
nuclear facilities (and, in the U.S. case, perhaps other targets) waxes
and wanes. With Rohani’s election, the resumption of nuclear talks
between the P5+1 and Iran, and the Obama administration’s failed
plan to strike Syria, the likelihood of military action seems, at least for
now, to have declined. But, if the United States and its British and
French partners are not prepared to adopt a more positivistic reading
of the NPT and to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue on such a basis,
then the current diplomatic effort between Iran and the P5+1 will
fail. And if diplomacy fails, the perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli
strike on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure will rise once
again, particularly as that infrastructure continues to develop and
expand. What does international law have to say about this?
Under a positivistic reading of international law, there are two
circumstances under which a state may legitimately use force. One is
when the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizing the use
of force in response to a specified threat to international peace and
security. The other is under a narrow reading of the right of
individual or collective self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the
Charter. This requires evidence of either an actual armed attack or a
threat of attack so imminent that a forceful response to it satisfies a
strict construal of the legal principle of necessity and can be carried
out in compliance with the legal principle of proportionality.55 In the
absence of a Chapter VII resolution from the Security Council or a
case meeting such a rigorous definition of self-defense, a state does
not have the right to use force.
It is highly unlikely that there will be a Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iran over its nuclear
activities, which eliminates one of the two potential legal justifications
for attacking Iranian nuclear targets. In the Iranian case, Russia and
China have learned from what they consider the bitter experience of
the Council’s engagement on WMD issues prior to the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, when Western powers justified the invasion in part by
arguing that resolutions adopted more than a decade earlier in
55 See id. (expanding on the “strict constructionist” and “imminent threat’
schools); Kleimann, supra note 30; Mary Ellen O’Connell, supra note 2.
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connection with the first Persian Gulf war also authorized the use of
force against Iraq in 2003.56 As a result, Moscow and Beijing have
made sure that Security Council resolutions dealing with the Iranian
nuclear issue state explicitly that nothing in them can be construed as
authorizing the use of force, and that such authorization would
require separate action by the Council.
But the lack of Security Council authorization does not
definitively constrain policy-oriented analysts and American officials,
who tend to downplay the centrality of the Council for contemporary
decision-making about the use of force.57 Some argue that the threat
of “WMD-seeking rogue states” has attenuated traditional readings of
the United Nations Charter on the Council’s role in addressing
threats to international peace and security.58 Others, like
neoconservative John Yoo, go so far as to argue that the United
States is entitled simply to ignore the Council on the grounds that it
“lacks political legitimacy” and “is contrary to both American
national interests and global welfare because it subjects any
intervention, no matter how justified or beneficial, to the approval of
authoritarian nations.”59
With the Security Council deemed irrelevant, the policyoriented case for launching a war against the Islamic Republic over its
nuclear activities relies on the notion of preventive self-defense.60
Consider, in this regard, Matthew Kroenig’s widely noted brief for
U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Kroenig begins his brief
by asserting “the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to
U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond” is so great as to
This point was especially salient in the arguments that the British and
Australian governments offered; while some American officials, most notably
Secretary of State Colin Powell, suggested that the United States shared the official
British and Australian view, this argument was not a major part of the Bush
administration’s formal case for war. See Alex Bellamy, International Law and the War
With Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 497 (2003), for further discussion on this topic.
57 Murphy, supra note 52, (discussing the “charter-is-dead” school).
58 Matthew Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).
59 John Yoo, An Unavoidable Challenge, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/286953/unavoidable-challenge-john-yoo.
60 This was also a major part of the Bush administration’s case for
invading Iraq in 2003. See Bellamy, supra note 54.
56
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require, at least for Kroenig and other like-minded analysts, a
heightened, post-9/11 formulation of imminent threat. As for
proportionality, Kroenig posits that “a military strike intended to
destroy Iran’s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the
region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the
long-term national security of the United States.”61
For this to work, though, the definition of “U.S. interests in
the Middle East and beyond” and “the long-term national security of
the United States” must be stretched to encompass not just physical
security but what might more accurately be described as hegemonic
preference. Consider what Kroenig himself writes regarding the real
motive for a prospective U.S. attack on Iran: “a nuclear armed Iran
would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle
East.”62 The reasoning underlying John Yoo’s advocacy of a
preventive U.S. attack on Iran is even more expansively hegemonic:
The United States has assumed the role, once held by
Great Britain, of guaranteeing free trade and
economic development, spreading liberal values, and
maintaining international security. An attack on
Iranian nuclear facilities, though it would impose
costs in human lives and political turmoil, would
serve these interests and forestall the spread of
conflict and terror.63
From a positivistic perspective, this amounts to a reading of
the right of self-defense so tortured that virtually no other state
besides the United States (or Israel) would accept it as justification
for a preventive attack against the Islamic Republic. But this is
precisely the argument that will be deployed, if and when the time
comes, to validate U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. U.S.
government lawyers are already drafting their briefs, should President
Obama decide in the next three years that the development of the
61 Matthew Kroenig, Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad
Option, FOR. AFF., Jan-Feb. 2012, at 77,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attackiran.
62 Id. at 78.
63 Yoo, supra note 57.
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Islamic Republic’s fuel cycle capabilities has gone too far for his
strategic or political comfort.
How the debate over the prospective use of force by the
United States against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure plays out will have
hugely important implications for the future of world order. In her
contribution to this symposium, Mary Ellen O’Connell presents a
rich exposition and defense of the U.N. Charter regime regarding the
use of force, along with an essentially positivistic application of this
regime and other relevant law to the prospective use of force against
Iranian nuclear targets. This leads her to a firm rejection of the
unilateral resort, by the United States or others, to armed coercion
against the Islamic Republic.64 James Houck, in his contribution,
evinces sympathy for arguments that a strict reading of the U.N.
Charter regime is not universally helpful to real-world decisionmakers in an era of WMD and demonstrated threats of terrorism.
Nevertheless, he also notes that, at this point, he has seen no
evidence or argument to date in the public domain leading him to
judge that a predicate currently exists for an armed attack on Iran.65
How this debate plays out will also have enormous
implications for America’s position in the international community.
As Americans engage in the debate, they would do well to consider
James Houck’s observation that there is much in public discussions
of these issues in the United States that is undermining and
disrespectful of international law.66 Such a trend, if perpetuated, will
prove corrosive not only of the prospects for genuinely rules-based
international order in the 21st century, but also of America’s standing
and role in world affairs.67
Restoring America’s international standing and influence—
and boosting the prospects for rules-based international order in the
21st century—will require very substantial strategic revision by the
United States. Consider, once again, the Obama administration’s
O’Connell, supra note 53.
See Presentation of James Houck at Symposium, video available at
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia.
66 Id.
67 This is explored more deeply in Mann Leverett, supra note 12.
64
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publicly announced plan to use force—without any legal justification
under the U.N. Charter—in Syria. After August 21, 2013, much of
America’s political class was initially still inclined to support President
Obama’s call for military action. Much of the mainstream media
comported themselves with the same lack of journalistic rigor that so
many media outlets displayed in evaluating the Bush administration’s
case for illegally invading and occupying Iraq in 2003. But, in 2013,
the American public rejected a sitting president’s case for imperial
war—and rejected it overwhelmingly, to a point where even many
congressmen and senators who would otherwise have backed
Obama’s initiative concluded that, this time, they could not do so. It
is not yet possible to know if Americans’ rejection of Obama’s call
for illegal and strategically dysfunctional U.S. military action against
Syria represents the beginning of a true sea change in popular
attitudes about American foreign policy. Perhaps it was simply the
product of a contingent concatenation of circumstances—postIraq/(not quite) post-Afghanistan/post-Libya “war weariness,”
frustration with a slow economic recovery and an uncertain longterm economic future, etc. But perhaps Americans are at least at the
start of a true learning curve. Only time will tell.
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